 |
Dr. Felix Brandt
Computer Science Department
Theoretical Computer Science (Room F10)
University of Munich
Oettingenstr. 67
80538 Munich, Germany
Tel. +49-89-2180 9691
email: brandtf@tcs.informatik.uni-muenchen.de
Office hour: by appointment
|
My research interests cover most of the fundamental issues that arise when multiple self-interested entities, so-called agents, interact. These issues include the analysis of optimal rational behavior in interactive situations and the design of mechanisms that allow agents to aggregate their possibly conflicting preferences such as in voting or auctions. In addition to tools from mathematics and economics, many concepts from theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence have proven to be very useful when analyzing such situations.
- Research topics: multiagent systems, game theory, mechanism design, auctions, social choice theory, cryptographic protocols, artificial intelligence
- Further fields of interest: cryptography, discrete mathematics, complexity theory, algorithms
-
Short Bio:
- Curriculum Vitae: [English] [German]
- Projects:
- Recent service
- Recent courses: "Algorithmische Graphentheorie", "Computational Social Choice", "Multiagentensysteme"
Publications
Journal Articles
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2009.
Forthcoming.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional
games.
Theory and Decision, 2009.
Forthcoming.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460-463, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444-459, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163-177, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
Ranking games.
Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221-239, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computing the minimal covering set.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254-268, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction
protocols.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2),
2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
How to obtain full privacy in auctions.
International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201-216,
2006.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
Other Publications
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability.
Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions.
2009.
Working paper.
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments.
2009.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Minimal stable sets in tournaments.
Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138, 2009.
Presented at the 9th International Meeting of the Society of Social
Choice and Welfare.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Tournament solutions - Extensions of maximality and their
applications to decision-making.
Habilitation Thesis, Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science, and
Statistics, University of Munich, 2009.
F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra.
Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time bribery
algorithms for single-peaked electorates.
2009.
Working paper.
F. Brandt.
Auctions.
In B. Rosenberg, editor, Handbook of Financial Cryptography.
CRC Press, 2010.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann.
The computational complexity of weak saddles.
In M. Mavronicolas and V. G. Papadopoulou, editors, Proceedings
of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume
5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 238-249.
Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe.
The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering
sets.
Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.3692, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum
games.
In M. Mavronicolas and V. G. Papadopoulou, editors, Proceedings
of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume
5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 287-298.
Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 209-216, 2009.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries.
In C. Papadimitriou and S. Zhang, editors, Proceedings of the
4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume
5385 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 198-209.
Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths.
Technical Report TR08-077, Electronic Colloquium on Computational
Complexity (ECCC), 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
In D. Fox and C. P. Gomes, editors, Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 38-43. AAAI Press,
2008.
Also presented at the 2nd International Workshop on Computational
Social Choice (COMSOC).
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria.
In B. Monien and U.-P. Schroeder, editors, Proceedings of the
1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 4997
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 291-302.
Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
PageRank as a weak tournament solution.
In X. Deng and F. Chung Graham, editors, Proceedings of the
3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume
4858 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 300-305.
Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs.
In R. C. Holte and A. Howe, editors, Proceedings of the 22nd
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 694-699. AAAI
Press, 2007.
Also presented at the 5th International Conference on Logic, Game
Theory and Social Choice (LGS).
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
In D. Samet, editor, Proceedings of the 11th Conference on
Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 82-91. ACM
Press, 2007.
An early version was presented at the 1st International Workshop on
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC).
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer.
Commitment and extortion.
In M. Huhns and O. Shehory, editors, Proceedings of the 6th
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(AAMAS), pages 108-115. ACM Press, 2007.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
In W. Thomas and P. Weil, editors, Proceedings of the 24th
International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS),
volume 4393 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages
212-223. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
An early version was presented at the 17th International Conference
on Game Theory (Stony Brook).
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent
scenarios.
In M. Veloso, editor, Proceedings of the 20th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1199-1206, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham.
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions.
In M. Veloso, editor, Proceedings of the 20th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1207-1214, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham.
On strictly competitive multi-player games.
In Y. Gil and R. Mooney, editors, Proceedings of the 21st
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 605-612. AAAI
Press, 2006.
Also presented at the 17th International Conference on Game Theory
(Stony Brook).
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions.
In A. Patrick and M. Yung, editors, Proceedings of the 9th
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC),
volume 3570 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages
298-312. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed
El Gamal encryption.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on
Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC), volume 3935 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 32-47. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
Unconditional privacy in social choice.
In R. van der Meyden, editor, Proceedings of the 10th Conference
on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 207-218.
National University of Singapore, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy.
In F. Dignum, V. Dignum, S. Koenig, S. Kraus, M. P. Singh, and
M. Wooldridge, editors, Proceedings of the 4th International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages
357-364. ACM Press, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms.
In H. L. Poutré, N. Sadeh, and S. Janson, editors, Revised
selected papers from the 7th AAMAS Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic
Commerce (AMEC), volume 3937 of Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence (LNAI), pages 212-225, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
(Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving
auctions.
In C. Sierra and L. Sonenberg, editors, Proceedings of the 3rd
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(AAMAS), pages 810-817. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2004.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Fundamental aspects of privacy and deception in electronic
auctions.
Doctoral Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical
University of Munich, 2003.
[ link |
errata ]
F. Brandt.
Private public choice.
Technical Report FKI-247-03, Department for Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich, 2003.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
F. Brandt.
Social choice and preference protection - Towards fully
private mechanism design.
In N. Nisan, editor, Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, pages 220-221. ACM Press, 2003.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds.
In R. N. Wright, editor, Proceedings of the 7th Annual
Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), volume 2742 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 223-238. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
A verifiable, bidder-resolved auction protocol.
In R. Falcone, S. Barber, L. Korba, and M. Singh, editors,
Proceedings of the 5th AAMAS Workshop on Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent
Societies (Special Track on Privacy and Protection with Multi-Agent
Systems), 2002.
[ pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Secure and private auctions without auctioneers.
Technical Report FKI-245-02, Department for Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich, 2002.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
F. Brandt.
Cryptographic protocols for secure second-price auctions.
In M. Klusch and F. Zambonelli, editors, Cooperative Information
Agents V, volume 2182 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
(LNAI), pages 154-165. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Antisocial agents and Vickrey auctions.
In J.-J. C. Meyer and M. Tambe, editors, Intelligent Agents
VIII, volume 2333 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI),
pages 335-347. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions.
In J. P. Müller, E. Andre, S. Sen, and C. Frasson, editors,
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents, pages
71-72. ACM Press, 2001.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
slides |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Antisocial bidding in repeated Vickrey auctions.
Technical Report FKI-241-00, Department for Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich, 2000.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
F. Brandt, W. Brauer, and G. Weiß.
Task assignment in multiagent systems based on Vickrey-type
auctioning and leveled commitment contracting.
In M. Klusch and L. Kerschberg, editors, Cooperative Information
Agents IV, volume 1860 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
(LNAI), pages 95-106. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part
III: Vickrey-type auctioning.
Technical Report FKI-238-00, Department for Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich, 2000.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part
II: Dutch-type auctioning.
Technical Report FKI-237-00, Department for Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich, 2000.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part
I: English-type auctioning.
Technical Report FKI-234-99, Department for Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich, 1999.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf |
ps ]
S. Schulz and F. Brandt.
Using term space maps to capture search control knowledge in
equational theorem proving.
In A. N. Kumar and I. Russell, editors, Proceedings of the 12th
Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference (FLAIRS), pages
244-248. AAAI Press, 1999.
[ link |
pdf |
ps |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Example selection for learning in automated theorem proving.
Diploma Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical
University of Munich, 1998.
[ pdf |
ps ]
Non-Scientific Publications
F. Brandt. Wie programmiere ich eine optimierte Linienroutine in Assembler?.
TOS (Magazin plus Software für den Atari ST & TT), 07/93, 1993.
[ jpg ]
F. Brandt. "Fullscreen"-Programming on the Atari ST.
Maggie, Issue #10, 1993.
[ txt ]
F. Brandt. Die Tricks der Fullscreen-Programmierung
TOS (Magazin plus Software für den Atari ST & TT), 02/92, 1992.
[ jpg ]
Legal note: The original versions of Springer publications are available at www.springerlink.com.
Teaching
[ Latest Update:
Monday, 02-Nov-2009 16:05:56 CET ]
